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PRINCIPAL

AND

AGENT-AN

AGENCY

RELATIONSHIP

ExISTS

BETWEEN A LARGE CORPORATE GRAIN DEALER AND A LOCAL GRAIN
ELEVATOR WHEN THE DEALER EXERCISES

DE

FACTO CONTROL OVER

THE OPERATIONS OF THE ELEVATOR.

Plaintiffs1 brought an action against Warren Grain and Seed
Company (Warren) and Cargill, Incorporated (Cargill) for losses
suffered when Warren defaulted on contracts made with the
plaintiffs for the sale of grain. 2 In 1964 Warren applied for and
received financing for working capital from Cargill. 3 Under this
agreement Warren received money by issuing drafts on Cargill. 4
Proceeds from Warren's sales were to be deposited with Cargill and
credited to its account. 5 In return for this, Cargill was appointed
Warren's grain agent and received the right of first refusal to
purchase market grain sold by Warren. 6
In 1967 Warren and Cargill signed a new contract that, in
addition to incorporating the 1964 agreement, added several
provisions. 7 Under this contract Warren agreed to provide Cargill
with an annual financial statement and to allow Cargill to keep its
1. A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981). Plaintiffs in this
action were 86 individual, partnership, or corporate farmers. Id. at 287. At trial plaintiffs attempted
to prove actual agency, so that was the only issue on appeal. Id. at 290.
2. Id. at 288. Warren purchased cash grain from local farmers that was resold through the
Minneapolis Grain Exchange or to terminal grain companies. Warren also stored grain for farmers
and bought and sold seed grain. Id.
3. Id. This money was loaned on "open account" financing with a stated limit of $175,000 in
1964. Id.
4. Id. These drafts were drawn through Minneapolis banks and imprinted with both Cargill's
and Warren's names. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. This market grain was grain sold by Warren to the terminal market. Id.
7. Id. The 1967 contract extended the credit limit to $300,000 and gave Cargill several rights
over Warren's business operations. Id.
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books. 8 Cargill's consent was required before Warren could make
improvements in excess of $5,000, become liable on another's
indebtedness, declare dividends, or sell or purchase stock. 9
Warren's credit limit was extended twice after the 1967
contract. 10 The relationship between Warren and Cargill continued
until 1977 when Warren ceased operations because of financial
difficulties. I1By 1977 Cargill had assumed a great deal of financial
and managerial control over Warren. 12 The Minnesota Supreme
Court,' 3 affirming the district court's verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs, held that Cargill, by its control and influence over
Warren, became a principal liable for transactions entered into by
its agent, Warren. 14 A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309
N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981).
Principles of agency 15 have grown out of the master-servant
8. Id.Warren could submit to being audited by an independent firm in lieu of allowing Cargill
to keep its books. Warren also allowed Cargill access to its books. Id.
9. Id. The provisions of the 1964 contract were incorporated into the 1967 agreement. Id.
10. Id. at 289. In 1972 Warren's credit line was extended to $750,000 and extended again in
1976 to $1,250,000. Id.
11. Id.An April 1977 audit revealed that Warren was four million dollars in debt. After Warren
ceased operations it was determined that Warren was indebted to Cargill in the amount of 3.6
million dollars. Id.
12. Id. at 291. The following are factors listed by the court to indicate Cargill's control over
Warren:
(1)Cargill's constant recommendations to Warren by telephone;
(2) Cargill's right of first refusal on grain;
(3) Warren's inability to enter into mortgages, to purchase stock or to pay
dividends without Cargill's approval;
(4) Cargill's right of entry onto Warren's premises to carry on periodic checks
and audits;
(5) Cargill's correspondence and criticism regarding Warren's finances, officers
salaries and inventory;
(6) Cargill's determination that Warren needed "strong paternal guidance";
(7) Provision of drafts and forms to Warren upon which Cargill's name was
imprinted;
(8) Financing of all Warren's purchases of grain and operating expenses; and
(9) Cargill's power to discontinue the financing of Warren's operations.
Id.
13. Id. at 287, 295. The opinion was written byjustice Peterson. Justice Simonett took no part.
Id.
14. 309 N.W.2d at 290. The court stated:
We hold that all three elements of agency could be found in the particular
circumstances of this case. By directing Warren to implement its recommendations,
Cargill manifested its consent that Warren would be its agent. Warren acted on
Cargill's behalf in procuring grain for Cargill as the part of its normal operations
which were totally financed by Cargill. Further, an agency relationship was
established by Cargill's interference with the internal affairs of Warren, which
constituted de facto control of the elevator.

Id.at 291.
The finding of control was based on 5 14 0 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. Section 14
O reads as follows: "A creditor who assumes control of his debtor's business for the mutual benefit of
himself and his debtor, may become a principal, with liability for the acts and transactions of the
debtor in connection with the business." RESTATEMENT (SEcoo) oF AGENCY 5 14 0 (1958).
15. The basis of agency is explained as follows: "The fundamental idea of agency has its
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relationship. 6 At common law an agent 17 was one who by the
authority and on the account of another undertook to do something
and to render account for it.t" In early cases the two essential
elements necessary to create an agency relationship were a
representative character and an authority that was derivative in
nature. 19
Today, many jurisdictions follow the Restatement (Second) of
Agency's (Restatement) definition 2" in determining whether an
agency relationship has been created. 2' The Restatement requires a
finding of a fiduciary relationship, "which results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other
shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the
other so to act. ',22
There are three essential elements in every agency
relationship. 23 The first element is consent; all agency relationships
are consensual in nature. 24 One cannot become the agent of
conception in something lawful that a person may do and a delegation by such person to another of
the power lawfully to do that thing." 2 AM. JR. 2D Agency 5 3 (1962).
16. W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 2 (1964). Seavey explains the purpose of the
law of agency as enabling one to use the services of another to accomplish things that he could not
accomplish alone. The rules of agency have evolved for the advancement of both business and the
community. Id. See generally Wyse, A Framework ofAnalysisfor the Law of Agency, 40 MONT. L. REV. 31
(1979) (basic agency principles concisely presented).
17. "The word agent or agency, from ago, agere, agens, agentis, denotes an actor, a doer, a force or
power that accomplishes things." F. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §1 .(4th ed. 1952).
18. Simon v. Vaughan & Blackwell, 165 Ky. 167, __, 176 S.W. 995,999 (1915). The court in
Simon discusses the common law requirements of agency in the context of insurance companies and
their employees. Id. at __,
176 S.W. at 998.
19. E.g., S. B. McMaster, Inc. v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 3 F.2d 469, 474 (E.D.S.C. 1925);
Thompson v. Atcheley, 201 Ala. 398, __,
78 So. 196, 198 (1917); International Harvester Co. v.
Commonwealth, 147 Ky. 655, __,
145 S.E. 393, 397 (1912), aff'd, 234 U.S. 557 (1913);
Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 170 N.Y. 13, __
, 62 N.E. 763, 765 (1902); Stroman v.
Brown, 116 Okla. 36, __, 243 P. 133, 134(1925).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958). Section 1(1) defines agency in the
following manner: "Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent
by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent
by the other so to act.'" Id,
21. E.g. United Packinghouse Workers v. Maurer-Neuer, Inc., 272 F.2d 647 (10th Cir. 1959);
Valley Nat'l Bank v. Milmoe, 74 Ariz. 290, 248 P.2d 740 (1953); Crouch v. Twin City Transit, 434
S.W.2d 816 (Ark. 1968); Norby v. Bankers Life, 304 Minn. 464, 231 N.W.2d 665 (1975).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 20.
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 20. Comment b to § 1(1) of the
Restatement describes the factual elements of an agency relationship:
Agency is a legal concept which depends upon the existence of required factual
elements: the manifestation by the principal that the agent shall act for him, the
agent's acceptance of the undertaking and the understanding of the parties that the
principal is to be in control of the undertaking. The relation which the law calls agency
does not depend upon the intent of the parties to create it, nor their belief that they
have done so. To constitute the relation, there must be an agreement, but not
necessarily a contract, between the parties; if the agreement results in the factual
relation between them to which are attached the legal consequences of agency, an
agency exists although the parties did not call it agency and did not intend the legal
consequences of the relation to follow.
Id. comment b.
24. Buck v. Nash-Finch Co., 78 S.D. 334, 343, 102 N.W.2d 84, 89 (1960). In Buck the court
refused to find an agency relationship because the debtor did not consent to the creditor's control of
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25
another without the latter's consent, either express or implied.
Express agreement arises when the parties agree orally or in
writing. 26 In the absence of an express agreement, the courts
will look to the circumstances in each case to determine whether the
conduct of the parties manifests mutual consent that one shall act
27
on the behalf of the other, subject to his control.
The creation of an agency relationship does not necessarily
depend on the intent of the parties, nor on their belief that they
have created an agency. 28 An agency may be proven not only by
direct evidence of an agreement between the parties, but also by
circumstantial evidence, such as words and conduct from which an
29
intention to create an agency may be fairly implied.
The second essential element for the creation of an agency
relationship is that the agent act on behalf of the principal.30 An act
by the agent on the principal's behalf will create an agency
relationship if the principal has indicated that it is unnecessary for
3
the agent to expressly accept to act on his behalf. 1
all aspects ofhis business. Id. at 348, 102 N.W.2d at 91. Seealso Valley View Cattle Co. v. Iowa Beef
Processors, 548 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1975) (creation of the relationship of agent and principal is
created by express or implied contract or by operation of law). Contra Weisenberger v. Corcoran, 275
Ky, 322, 121 S.W.2d 712 (1938); Cassiday Fork Boom & Lumber Co. v. Terry, 69 W. Va. 572, 73
S.E. 278 (1912) (Corcoran and Cassiday represent the older view of the agency relationship as a
contractual rather than a consensual relationship).
25. E.g., Nerland v. Schiavone, 250 Minn. 160, 84 N.W.2d 61 (1957). In Nerland the court
concluded that "Itihe principal must in some way manifest his consent before the agent has authority
toact ... If the agent's authority is to be implied, such implication must be drawn from facts for
which the principal is responsible." Id. at 165, 84 N.W.2d at 65.
26. E.g., State v. Hostetter, 344 Mo. 665, 127 S.W.2d 697 (1939). The court in Hostetteradopted
Webster's definition of express: that which is "directly and distinctly stated; expressed, not merely
implied or left to inference." Id. at __, 127 S.W.2d at 699.
27. E.g., Walnut Hills Farms, Inc. v. Farmers Co-op, 244 N.W.2d 778 (Iowa 1976). The court
defined an implied agency as "an actual agency which may be established by the surrounding
circumstances and inferences arising therefrom." Id. at 781.
28. E.g., Tax Comm'n v. Parsons-Jurden Corp., 9 Ariz. App. 92, 499 P.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1969)
(agency is ultimately a question of intention of the parties as evidenced by their acts and is not
dependent upon what the particular person is called); Crown v. Hertz Corp., 382 F.2d 681 (5th Cir.
1967). The court in Crown concluded that the law treats the relationship as one of principal and agent
if the parties actually place themselves in a position that requires the relationship to be inferred. Id.at
688.
29. E.g., Pay-n-Taket, Inc. v. Crooks, 259 Iowa 719, 145 N.W.2d 621 (1966) (the inquiry of
whether there is an agency relationship is a question of fact and the burden of proving this
relationship is on the party asserting its existence); Andrew v. Rolsrud, 218 Iowa 15, 253 N.W. 913
(1934). Since existence of the agency is a question of fact, the court in Andrew upheld the following
jury instruction:
An agency may be created by implication. It must be based on facts for which the
Principal is responsible. It is a question of fact, to be determined by the facts and the
inferences drawn therefrom. The authority need not be expressly conferred, and in
many cases it is informally conferred, or is inferred from the acts and conduct of the
principal. The important thing is to find the assent of the principal, either exprels or
implied.
Id.at 18, 253 N.W. at 914.
30. E.g., Nicholas v. Moore, 570 P.2d 174 (Alaska 1978). The court in Nicholas concluded that
one may become an agent by voluntarily performing a gratuitous service for another, but consent
does not arise until an individual begins performing a service or acting on his behalf. Id. at 176.
31. Id. The court noted that the inference of an agency relationship "is strengthened if, being
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The third essential element of an agency relationship is the
right of the principal to control the agent.3 2 The right to control
need not be exercised. 33 The Restatement describes the element
of "continuous subjection to the will of the principal as the
distinguishing factor between agents and other fiduciaries and
agency agreements and other agreements. "34
Generally, a debtor-creditor relationship is not an agency
relationship.3 5 For example, a creditor bank is not a principal liable
for the acts and transactions of its borrower. A debtor-creditor
relationship, however, may become an agency relationship. 36 This
evolution is described in section 14 0 of the Restatement: "A
creditor who assumes control of his debtor's business for the
mutual benefit of himself and his debtor, may become a principal,
with liability for the acts and transactions of the debtor in
37
connection with the business." ,
requested to act in the matter, the other does something which he could properly do only as an
authorized agent." Id. (citations and emphasis omitted).
32. E.g., Universal Life Church, Inc. v. Commissioner of Lottery, 96 Mich. App. 385, 292
N.W.2d 169 (Ct. App. 1978) (individual church was not the agent of a religious organization
because the religious organization had no control over the actions of the church); Vieths v. Ripley,
295 N.W.2d 659 (Minn. 1980). In Vieths the court reasoned that since there were no facts showing
that an employer was acting as an agent for a powerlines' owner, it was error to impute negligence of
employer to owner. Thus, the decision was based on the absence of the owner's right to control the
employer. Id. at 664.
In Teeman v. Jurek, 312 Minn. 292, 251 N.W.2d 698 (1977), an agency relationship was not
found between a buyer and a seller because the record indicated absolutely no element of control. Id.
at 299, 251 N.W.2d at 702.
33. Dumas v. Lloyd, 6 Ill.
App. 3d 1026, __,
286 N.E.2d 566, 569 (App. Ct. 1972). In
Dumas, although the company did not exercise any control over the manager, the court concluded
that the control requirement necessary for the creation of an agency relationship is satisfied when
only the right to control exists. Id. at -, 286 N.E.2d at 569.
InJurek v. Thompson, 308 Minn. 191, 241 N.W.2d 788 (1976), the court described the right to
control as the critical element, saying that it is this element that distinguishes agency from other
relationships. Id. at 198-99, 241 N.W.2d at 791.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF AGENCY, supra note 20, comment b, at 8.The comment provides
that the "characteristics which tend to indicate an agency or a non-agency relation are stated in
sections 12 to 14 0." Id.
35. A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (1981). The writers of the
amicus briefs were very concerned about the effect an affirmance would have on debtor-creditor
relationships. Id. at 292. The court inJenson attempted to console them by saying, "We deal here
with a business enterprise markedly different from an ordinary bank financing, since Cargill was an
active participant in Warren's operations rather than simply a financier." Id.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 14. The section comment expands this
concept, stating:
A security holder who merely exercises a veto power over the business acts of his
debtor by preventing purchases or sales above specified amounts does not thereby
become a principal. However, if he takes over the management of the debtor's
business either in person or through an agent, and directs what contracts may or may
not be made, he becomes a principal, liable as any principal for the obligations
incurred thereafter in the normal course of business by the debtor who has now
become his general agent. The point at which the creditor becomes a principal is that
at which he assumes de facto control over the conduct of his debtor, whatever the
terms of the formal contract with his debtor may be.
Id.comment a.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF AGENCY, supra note 14. For the text of 5 14 0, see supra note 14.
The application of this section of the Restatement by the courts has been very sparse, with only one
case directly applying S 14 0. Buck v. Nash-Finch Co., 78 S.D. 334, 102 N.W.2d 84 (1960).
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Some early examples of the extent to which a creditor may
exercise control without liability as a principal are found in Waldie
v. Steers Sand & Gravel Corp.3 8 and Wasilowski v. Park Bridge Corp.39 In
Waldie the libellant's barge was damaged. 40 He sued the charterer,
the tug, the consignee, and the surety of the consignee. 4' 'The
consignee was in danger of defaulting on its contract, so its surety,
after advancing the consignee money, hired an engineer to
42
supervise and have complete control over the contract.
The court in Waldie did not hold the surety liable because the
purpose of the surety was not to take over the contract, but to
protect loans that it had made to the consignee. 4 3 The court seemed
to hint at the idea that was later developed in section 14 0 of the
Restatement 44 when it noted that if nothing more had appeared
than the agreement giving the engineer complete control and
stating that his decisions were to be binding, the surety might have
been held liable. 45 The engineer, however, never gave directions,
made any contracts, or ordered any materials. The surety,
therefore, could not be considered to have taken over the
contract.

46

In Wasilowski4 7 the court held that a creditor who financed a
party who defaulted on its subcontracts was not liable as a principal
because the debtor retained some interest in the completion of the
contract. 48 The Wasilowski court held that a relationship that was
initially a debtor-creditor relationship could not become a
principal-agent relationship as long as the party whom the creditor
9
was financing retained any interest in completion of the contract.4
38. 151 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1945) (decided before 5 14 0 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency
was drafted).
39. 156 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1946) (decided before § 14 0 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency
was drafted).
40. Waldie v. Steers Sand & Gravel Corp., 151 F.2d 129, 129 (2d Cir. 1945). Although Waldie
was decided before § 14 0 of the Restatement was written, it provides a good example of how much
control could be exercised by a surety, in protecting a loan, before it would be held liable. See id. at
131.
41. Id. The consignee of the barge's cargo directed delivery at the wharf under a government
contract. Id. at 130.
42. Id. The surety was only willing to lend the consignee money if it could be properly secured.
The parties therefore agreed that the money be put in the surety's control. Id.
43. Id. The test applied by the court in Waldie was whether the surety had completely taken over
the contract. Id.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 14. Sections 14A and 14 0 of the
Restatement were written to aid in the often difficult inquiry of whether the relationship is one of
principal and agent. See id. topic 4, scope note.
45. 151 F.2dat 131.
46. Id. If the engineer had exercised these powers and taken over the contract, a finding of
liability based on agency principles would be consistent with 5 14 0 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency.
47. Wasilowski v. Park Bridge Corp., 156 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1946) (a debtor having no interest
would seem to suggest that a creditor has complete control).
48. Id. at 614. The debtors were very insistent about protecting their interest in the contract. Id.
at 615.
49. Id. The court in Wasilowski framed the central inquiry as whether the debtor had any
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The creditor demanded and received complete authority to
supervise, power to approve all the debtor's actions, and complete
control of all the money. Because the debtor retained an interest,
however, the creditor could not be held liable as a principal on
0
agency theories)5
Whether a creditor should be held liable as a principal was also
discussed in Buck v. Nash-Finch Co. 5' Nash-Finch, a wholesale
grocery, financed Boedeker, a Piggly-Wiggly franchise owner,
through Merchant Finance, one of Nash-Finch's wholly owned
subsidiaries. 5 2 The court recognized Nash-Finch's dual interest,
but noted that Nash-Finch had no control over the retailer's buying
operations; its interest in an outlet for its goods was only a
possibility, with Nash-Finch's main interest being the protection of
its loan. 5 Nash-Finch, through Merchant Finance, required
Boedeker to hire a manager who was given a great deal of control
over the operation of the store. 5 4 The court in Buck refused to find
Nash-Finch liable as a principal under section 14 0 for contracts
that its debtor, Boedeker, had defaulted on because there was no
mutual consent giving Nash-Finch complete control over every
aspect of the business. 5 5 Section 14 0 requires that a creditor
assume de facto control of his debtor's business before liability
56
based on agency can result.
The above cases show a tendency of the courts to allow
creditors a great deal of control in protecting their loans before
finding them liable as principals for their debtor's obligations.5 7
interest, rather than whether the creditor had complete control. Id. The court's emphasis on the
continued interest, however, indicates that the debtor had not abandoned the contract. Logically, if
the contract had not been abandoned, the creditor could not assume complete control and vice versa.

Id.
50. Id.
51. 78 S.D. 334, 102 N.W.2d 84 (1960).
52. Buck v. Nash-Finch Co., 78 S.D. 334, 336, 102 N.W.2d 84, 85 (1960). Boedeker's
obligations were adequately secured by chattel mortgages on the fixtures, equipment, and stock of
merchandise; real estate mortgages; and an assignment of the life insurance contracts on the life of
Boedeker. Id.
53. Id. at 347, 102 N.W.2d at 90. The court seemed to feel that Nash-Finch was an ordinary
creditor. Boedeker bought much of his merchandise from other wholesalers and was under no
obligation to buy from Nash-Finch. Id. at 337,102 N.W.2d at 85.
54. Id. at 338-41, 102 N.W.2d at 86-87. In a memorandum from his creditor, the franchise
owner was instructed on the manager's duties:
Estel is to handle all the money, both that coming in and going out. It will be up to him
to check the cash registers, make the deposits, handle all payouts, make up the payroll
and pay off employees. In connection with the records, he is to keep all books and
records which are needed so the accountant at Sioux Falls can make up his records and
reports.

Id. at 339, 102 N.W.2d at 86-87.
55. Id. at 348-49, 102 N.W.2d at 91. No mutual assent was found because despite the creditor's
control in many areas, the debtor, Boedeker, controlled all purchases of merchandise for the store.

Id.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 14. For the text of § 14 0, see supra note 14.

57. 78 S.D. at 348-49, 102 N.w.2d at 91-92.
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Both the Wasilowski and Buck cases may be distinguished from the
Jenson case on the basis of the characteristics of the creditors
involved. In Wasilowski and Buck the creditors were ordinary
financiers. 58 Both courts refused to find the creditors liable on
agency principles because the creditors had not assumed control of
every aspect of the debtor's businesses or contracts, nor had the
debtors given up all interest. 59 The creditors in all three cases
exercised a great deal of control, but in Jenson, Cargill was doing
60
more than protecting its loan to Warren.
Often a buyer-supplier relationship will resemble a principalagent

relationship.

6

'

The

comments

to

section

Restatement6 2

14K

explain the distinguishing factors. 63
indicating that one is a seller and not an agent are:

of the

Factors

(1) That he is to receive a fixed price for the property,
irrespective of the price paid by him. This is the most
important. (2) That he acts in his own name and receives
the title to the property which he thereafter is to transfer.
(3) That he has an independent business in buying and
64
selling similar property.

No single factor is determinative. 65 Instead, the courts will look at
the substance of the transaction to determine whether one is a
66
supplier or an agent.

The major issue in A. GayJenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc. 67 was
whether Cargill could be held liable as a principal for contracts
58. Wasilowski v. Park Bridge Corp., 156 F.2d at 613 (the debtors secured a loan from the Park
Bridge Corp.); Buck v. Nash-Finch, 78 S.D. at 336, 102 N.W.2d at 85 (Nash-Finch financed
Boedeker through Merchant Finance, one of its wholly owned subsidiaries).
59. Wasilowski v. Park Bridge Corp., 156 F.2d at 614 (debtors were very insistent about
protecting their interest); Bock v. Nash-Finch Co., 78 S.D. at 348-49, 102 N.W.2d at 91 (no consent
that Nash-Finch would control Boedeker's buying operations).
60. SeeJenson, 309 N.W.2d at 292. Cargill's purpose was not to make money as a lender, but to
find a source of market grain. Id. at 293.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14K (1958). The Restatement compares an agent with
a supplier in the following manner: "One who contracts to acquire property from a third person and
convey it to another is the agent of the other only if it is agreed that he is to act primarily for the
benefit of the other and not for himself." Id. For cases applying § 14K and the factors which
distinguish an agent from a supplier, see Lubbock Feed Lots, Inc. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc.. 630
F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1980); Valley View Cattle Co. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 548 F.2d 1219 (5th
Cir. 1977); Rufenacht v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Farmers
Elevator Co. v. Pheister, 153 Mont. 152, 455 P.2d 325 (1969).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 61.
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 61, comment a, at 75.
64. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY, supra note 61, comment a, at 75.

65. The Jenson court discussed only the third factor in § 14K, the independent business
requirement. 309 N.W.2d at 292. The court reasoned that because all segments of Warren's business
were financed by Cargill, there was no independent business. Id. The court concluded, therefore,
that the relationship was more than that ofa buyer-supplier. Id.
66. See generally W. SEELL, AGENCY §§ 32-33 (1975).
67. 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981).

CASE COMMENT

843

entered into by Warren. 68 The court concluded that Cargill was a
69
principal liable for the contracts on which Warren defaulted.
Cargill's liability was based on its control and influence over
Warren. 7 0 The court determined that the three elements necessary
for the creation of an agency were present. 7 The three elements
essential to any agency relationship are mutual consent, action by
one on another's behalf, and a right of control over the one
acting. 72
In discussing the elements of consent and action, the court
reasoned that Cargill had manifested its consent that Warren be its
agent by directing Warren to implement Cargill's recommendations. The court also noted that Warren had acted on
Cargill's behalf in procuring grain for Cargill. These findings were
enough to satisfy the consent and action elements of agency. 13
The major emphasis inJenson was placed on the third element
- the element of control. 7 4 Normally the element of control is
articulated as the right to control,7 5 but inJenson the court based the
control element on section 14 0 of the Restatement, 7 6 which states
that a creditor who assumes control of his debtor's business may be
held liable as a principal. 7 7 Logically, an assumption of de facto
control encompasses the right to control, but only one case has
taken the approach of basing the right to control on section 14 0 of
the Restatement.7 8 Traditionally creditors have been allowed to
assume a great deal of control over their debtors' businesses and
actions to protect their loans. 7 9 InJenson, however, the court found
68. Id. at 290.

69. Id.
70. !d. at 291. The court in.jenson concluded that control by Cargill was necessary for finding

liability based on agency principles. Id. Control is necessary for an agency relationship under both
S 1 and S 14 0 of the Restatement RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 20; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 14.

71. 309 N.W.2d at 291.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 20.

73. 309 N.W.2d at 291.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 20. While all three elements are necessary for

the creation of'an agency relationship, it is often the element of control which distinguishes an agency
relationship from other relationships. Id.comment b.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY S 14 (1958). The Restatement provides that "[al
principal has the right to control the conduct of the agent with respect to matters entrusted to him."

Id.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 14.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 14.

78. Buck v. Nash-Finch Co., 78 S.D. 334, 102 N.W.2d 84 (1960). In Buck a grocery wholesaler
was financing a local retailer through Merchant Finance, one of its wholly owned subsidiaries. Even
though the creditor had a dual interest, the loan and a possible market for its wholesale goods, the
creditor was not held liable as a principal because he had not assumed de facto control of his debtor's
business. Id. at 348, 102 N.W.2d at91. This case may be distinguished fromJenson on the basis of the
interest. Although the creditor had an interest in a possible market, he exercised no control in this
area, whereas Cargill was motivated by its need for grain and controlled this aspect of Warren's
business.
79. Id. at 348-49, 102 N.W.2d at 91-92. The Buck court concluded that "the courts have not
hesitated in holding evidence of broad measures of control by a creditor insufficient to sustain a
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that Cargill had assumed control of Warren and was therefore
0
liable as a principal. 8
The court in Jenson relied heavily on Butler v. Bunge Corp., 8 in
which Bunge, a large commodities corporation similar to Cargill,
was held liable as a principal because of the control it exercised over
the operations of a grain elevator.8 2 The court in Bunge did not rely
on section 14 0 of the Restatement, 83 but the result in both cases
was that a grain company that asserts sufficient control over an
elevator will be held responsible for the acts and transactions of the
elevator on agency principles. 84
finding that the debtor was authorized to contract on behalf of the creditor as an undisclosed
principal." Id.
80. 309 N.W.2d at 291.
Another court may have based liability on the law of partnership or joint venture. See, e.g.,
,Johnson v. Plastex Co., 500 P.2d 596, 598 (Okla. 1971). Section 6 (1) of the Uniform Partnership
Act provides that "[a] partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit." UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT S 6 (1) (1914).
Section 15 of the Uniform Partnership Act provides that "la]llpartners are liable jointly and
severally for everything chargeable to the partnership." Id. § 15. However, § 7 (4) (d) of the Uniform
Partnership Act provides as follows:
In determining whether a partnership exists, these rules shall apply:
(4) the receipt by a person of a share of the profits is prima facie evidence that he
is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such profits were
received in payment:
(d)'As interest on a loan, though the amounts of payment vary with the profits of
the business.
Id. 7 (4) (d).
81. 329 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
82. Butler v. Bunge Corp., 329 F. Supp. 47, 61 (N.D. Miss. 1971). The Bungecourt found the
following elements ofcontrol:
(1)Bunge furnished all or practically all of the means and appliances for the work; (2)
Bunge furnished substantially all funds received by Bayles; (3) Bunge controlled the
destination of all grain handled by Bayles; (4) Bunge controlled the price, weights and
grades of all grain handled by Bayles; (5) Bunge, on certain occasions, permitted
Bayles to sell a limited quantity of grain to other buyers; (6) Bunge not only had the
right to direct details important to grain buying but gave actual direction to Bayles
through constant contact, quoting its price to him and consulting with him regarding
prices for the farmers; (7) Bunge had a significant degree of control over the operation
of the grain elevator at Roundaway in such areas as training Bayles' personnel,
inspecting the premises and requiring maintenance of insurance against hazards of
operation; (8)Bayles' grain transaction with farmers was the identical type of business
activity that was regularly carried on by Bunge, and Bayles' transactions formed a
substantial part of Bunge's business that was developed from the area in which
Coahoma Grain Elevator operated; and finally (9) although the agreement formally
specified a fixed term, the relationship between the parties had no viability apart from
grain dealings that were wholly subject to Bunge's will.

Id. The court concluded that these elements of control "make clear that Bunge did not consider
Bayles an independent operator who was free to become Bunge's competitor in buying grain from
the farmers in the region, but rather that he was effectually given authority to buy grain from
Bunge." Id.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 14.
84. Bunge was held liable because the operator of its grain elevator was an agent not an
independent contractor. This distinction was made by an analysis of the control exercised by Bunge
over the operator. 329 F. Supp. at 61. The court refused to allow Bunge to claim that Bayles was an
independent contractor when Bunge had maintained complete control of the business. Id. at 58.
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The Jenson court's heavy reliance on Bunge was justified
even though Bunge dealt with whether a grain elevator operator was
an independent contractor or an agent, because the ultimate
inquiry was the same. 85 The ultimate inquiry in both cases was
86
whether the essential element of control was present.
The Jenson court retreated from previous decisions of other
courts allowing an extensive degree of control to creditors. The
court's analysis of control consisted of listing nine factors, 87 which
in the Jenson court's opinion indicated de facto control under
section 14 0.88

Four of the nine factors involved communications between
Warren and Cargill, including statements by Cargill, regarding
recommendations, finances, salaries, inventory, and sample
business forms. 89 Two of the factors arguably involved veto
power. 90 The two factors involving the veto power were Cargill's
right of first refusal on grain and Warren's inability to enter into
mortgages, to purchase stock, or to pay dividends without
Cargill's approval. 91 The court did acknowledge that some of these
elements are found in an ordinary debtor-creditor relationship, but
concluded that the factors must be "viewed in light of all the
circumstances surrounding Cargill's aggressive financing of
Warren. ',92
85. Id. at 54. In Bunge the court analyzed an operator's agreement and found that this agreement
gave Bunge absolute control over all grain received by Bayles. Id.at 57.
86. The Bunge andJensoncourts relied on similar indicia of an agency relationship. 391 F. Supp.
at 61; 309 N.W.2d at 291. For a listing of the factors considered by the courts, see supra notes 12 &
82.
87. 309 N.W.2d at 291. For a listing of the nine factors relied on by theJenson court, see supra'
note 12.
88. The relationship between the debtors and creditors in the earlier cases was more in the
nature of an ordinary financier relationship, whereas Cargill was an active participant in the Jenson
case.
89. 309 N.W.2d at 291. Forthe text of S 14 O ofthe Restatement, see supra note 14.
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 14, comment a. Comment a to 5 14 0
provides as follows:
A security holder who merely exercises a veto power over the business acts of his

debtor by preventing purchases or sales above specified amounts does not thereby
become a principal. However, if he takes over the management of the debtor's
business either in person or through an agent, and directs what contracts may or may
not be made, he becomes a principal, liable as any principal for the obligations
incurred thereafter in the normal course of business by the debtor who has now
become his general agent. The point at which the creditor becomes a principal is that
at which he assumes de facto control over the conduct of his debtor, whatever the
terms of the formal contract with his debtor may be.
Where there is an assignment for the benefit of creditors, the latter may become
the principals of the assignee if they exercise control over transactions entered into by
him on their behalf.
Id.
91. 309 N.W.2d at 288.
92. Id. at 291. Cargill had stated at some time during its association with Warren that Warren
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The remaining three factors were Cargill's right of entry onto
Warren's premises to carry on periodic checks and audits, Cargill's
financing of all of Warren's purchases of grain and operating
expenses, and Cargill's power to discontinue the financing of
Warren's operations. These factors are either elements of an
ordinary debtor-creditor relationship or, like the veto powers
discussed above, are methods used by unsecured creditors to
protect their loans. 93 The factors of control noted by the court
included communications, veto powers, elements of ordinary
debtor-creditor relationships, and controls often used by unsecured
creditors. 94 Despite a finding of liability based on the factors of
control set out above, the court assured creditors that they would
still be able to protect their loans. The court noted that in this case
Cargill was, by its active participation, more than a financier. 9
Cargill attempted to avoid liability under agency principles by
arguing that the relationship between Cargill and Warren was
merely one of buyer-supplier rather than principal-agent. 96 The
court rejected this argument because Warren did not have an
independent business in buying and selling similar property, which
is required by section 14K of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency.91
Cargill also contended that even if it were established that it
was Warren's principal, it was an undisclosed principal because the
plaintiffs had failed to establish that they had notice of a principal.
Cargill argued that as an undisclosed principal it could not be held
needed "very strong paternal guidance." Id. at 289. This determination led to Cargill's aggressive
financing, as Cargill had already been involved in two similar situations and suffered heavy losses.

Id.
93. Id. at 288. Cargill's loan was, for all practical purposes, unsecured. Only the first $175,000
that Cargill lent Warren was secured. Id. In 1977 Warren was indebted to Cargill in the amount of
$3.6 million. Id. at 289.
94. Id. at 291.
95. Id. at 292. The court clearly was not convinced that Cargill's role was that solely of a
financier. The court said:
Further, we are not persuaded by the fact that Warren was not one of the "line"
elevators that Cargill operated in its own name. The Warren operation, like the line
elevator, was financially dependent on Cargill's continual infusion of capital. The
arrangement with Warren presented a convenient alternative to the establishment of a
line elevator. Cargill became, in essence, the owner of the operation without the
accompanying legal indicia.
Id. The court found a unique fabric in the relationship between Warren and Cargill, which was very
different from a normal debtor-creditor relationship. Id. at 293.
96. Id. at 291.
97. Id. The court did not mention the first two factors in 5 14K of the Restatement for
distinguishing an agency and a buyer-supplier relationship. These two factors involve a
determination of whether the buyer is to receive a fixed price for the goods sold regardless of the price
paid, and whether the buyer acts in its own name and receives title to the property. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 61.
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liable because all its accounts with Warren had been settled. 98 The
court dismissed this contention by adopting section 208 of the
Restatement, 9 9 a minority position. Section 208 states:
An undisclosed principal is not discharged from
liability to the other party to a transaction conducted by
an agent by payment to, or settlement of accounts with,
the agent, unless he does so in reasonable reliance upon
conduct of the other party which is not induced by the
agent's misrepresentations and which indicates that the
agent has settled the account.' 0 0
The implications of the Jenson decision vary in significance
depending on whether the case is read broadly or narrowly. The
court in Jenson seemed to suggest that this decision should be read
narrowly when it reassured the amici curiae that firms and banks
would not decline to make further loans to country elevators if the
verdict were upheld.' 1 The court said, "The decision in this case
should give no cause for such concern. We deal here with a business
enterprise markedly different from ordinary bank financing, since
Cargill was an active participant in Warren's operations rather
than simply a financier. 10 2 Cargill's purpose in making the loan
was not to make money as a lender but to obtain the grain it needed
10 3
for its business.
If this decision is confined to situations in which a corporation
is financing a smaller enterprise, not to make money from interest
on loans but to obtain necessary goods, the impact of the decision
will be limited. The impact will be especially limited in the grain
industry because large corporations, like Cargill, will continue their
98. 309 N.W.2d 'at293. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether Cargill was a
disclosed or undisclosed principal by adopting 5208 of the Restatement. Id.
99. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY 5 208 (1958). For cases, annotations, and law review
articles discussing the rationale and development of the minority and majority positions of an
undisclosed principal's liability after settlement, see Poretta v. Superior Dowel Co., 153 Me. 308,
137 A.2d 361 (1957); Annot., 71 A.L.R.2D 911 (1960); Gray, The Liability of Undisclosed Principals
After Settlement with an Agent, 18 Miss. L.J. 436 (1946-1947); Seavey, Undisclosed Principal; Unsettled
Problems, I How. L.J. 79 (1955).
100. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY, supra note 99. Under § 208 Cargill would be liable
whether it was a disclosed principal or an undisclosed principal. Id.
101. 309 N.W.2d at 292. The court felt that Cargill's relationship with Warren was more akin to
the relationship that Cargill had with its line elevators than to an ordinary debtor-creditor
relationship. The relationship of Cargill with its line elevators was a relationship of owner-operator.

Id.
102. Id. Respondent's brief referred to the testimony of the president of the Minnesota Farmers
Elevator Association. The president stated that Cargill's relationship with Warren was far from the
customary commission house-country elevator relationship. Respondent's Brief at 22-23.
103. 309 N.W.2d at 293. A Cargill manager stated that they were staying in because they
wanted the grain. Notwithstanding the risk, Cargill considered the operation profitable. Id.
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aggressive financing of small elevators. This course of action is the
only practical way for them to get the grain they need to stay in
business. 10 4 Under this interpretation, the decision will only serve
to warn similar businesses that they cannot go as far as Cargill did
105
and expect to avoid liability based on agency principles.
The Buck case provides a good example of a situation between
the extremes of Cargill and Warren and an ordinary debtorcreditor relationship. 0 6 In Buck, Nash-Finch, a grocery wholesaler,
financed a local retailer through Merchant Finance Company, one
of Nash-Finch's wholly owned subsidiaries. 07 The court
recognized Nash-Finch's dual interests, one in protecting the loan
and another in the possibility of developing a market for its
wholesale goods, but refused to find an agency relationship based
on section 14 0. Creditor liability based on agency principles under
section 14 0 results only when a creditor assumes de facto control
of its debtor's business.10 8 Nash-Finch, while controlling many
aspects of its debtor's business, did not control the retailer's buying
operations. 10 9 An application of the Cargill decision in situations
such as this might deter creditors like Nash-Finch from making
loans to smaller businesses, despite the possibility of developing a
market for their goods.
If the rationale of this decision is applied to traditional debtorcreditor relationships, the implications are significant. The failure
of the court to specify which elements of control caused the agency
relationship to arise coupled with the nature of the elements of
control, specifically communications, veto powers, and traditional
devices used by unsecured creditors, might lead ordinary financiers
to refuse to make loans to small elevators. This would be
detrimental to all parties involved, including farmers. It is also
possible that ordinary creditors will take action in the opposite
direction and exercise a great deal of control to make sure that the
loans they make are used beneficially. This would result in a
tremendous inconvenience to elevator operators and affect
104. Respondent's Brief at 61. This statement was made by plaintiff's counsel in refuting the
contention that a ruling in favor of the plaintiff would cause all country elevators to go broke. Id.
105. Id.
106. Buck v. Nash-Finch Co., 78 S.D. 334, 102 N.W.2d 84 (1960). Although Nash-Finch had
dual interests, its interest in developing a market for its wholesale products was merely a potentiality.
The retailer bought many of his goods from other wholesalers and was not obliged to buy from NashFinch. Nash-Finch never controlled any aspect of the retailer's buying. Id. at 337, 102 N.W.2d at 85.
107. Id.
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 14.
109. 78S.D. at 337, 102 N.W.2d at 85.
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everyone adversely, because most traditional creditors do not have
the expertise to be actively involved in this area. t 10

LESLIE

E.

BEIERS

110. There maybe another possible interpretation of the court's decision based on an analogous
situation in which the courts require actual control before an agency relationship may be created.
This situation arises in the area of corporations and their subsidiaries. For a corporation to be
held
liable for the obligations of its sudsidiary on an agency theory, actual control must be proved.
The
courts define this as an old rule of law applied to a new situation. The exception to the general
rule
that corporations will not be held liable for the obligatiops of their subsidiaries arises when
a
corporation exercises actual control. E.g., Japan Petroleum Co. v. Ashland Oil, 465 F. Supp.
831
(D. Del. 1978). It is conceivable that the court in Jenson was trying to establish the same rule
by the
use of § 14 0. If this is true, creditors would be afforded a higher degree of protection because
the
third requirement for the creation of an agency relationship, the right to control, would
be
transformed to actual control.

